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Abstract 
This article focuses on the relationship between transparency, 
corporate governance of publicly traded companies, and capital markets. The 
central question of this article is: if the requirements of ownership 
transparency are imposed on companies, does this create opportunities for 
effective governance of capital markets or does this impose constraints on 
corporate performance? Capital markets include equity markets (stocks) and 
debt markets (bonds). Equity is the price that investors (e.g., lenders, 
shareholders) will pay for a company’s stock. The value of that equity 
depends on the company’s corporate governance system, which effectively is 
an equity contract outlining the terms of the equity investment. Corporate 
governance systems allow stakeholders to monitor the company’s 
performance and to adopt and execute measures to deal with poor 
performance. Transparency is essential to corporate governance since it 
allows for the monitoring of company’s performance through disclosure of 
finances, profits, losses, and related reporting. Professor Gilson argues that 
two forms of transparency are required for effective corporate governance: 
financial disclosure and ownership transparency.1 There is ample scholarly 
literature on the topic of financial disclosure regulations and obligations.  
This article focuses primarily on company ownership transparency. 
Ownership transparency refers to disclosure about majority shareholders, in 
particular, as well as knowledge and disclosure of minority shareholders for 
the purposes of protecting such shareholders. On the one hand, ownership 
transparency can improve a company’s performance by preventing “a 
controlling shareholder’s divergence of earnings or opportunities to itself.”2 
On the other hand, ownership transparency requirements may unduly burden 
issuers and shareholders alike as well as create a negative impact on 
corporate performance. This article addresses these issues and discusses 
possible solutions. 
 
Keywords: company ownership disclosure, beneficial ownership, 
transparency, capital markets, corporate governance, EU Transparency 
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Creating companies is synonymous with entrepreneurship, 
innovation, and, to some, the achievement of a life-long dream. In the United 
States alone, over two million corporations and limited liability corporations 
(LLCs) are created annually,3 arguably a testament to the U.S. being an 
attractive market in which to do business. Similarly, millions of companies 
are created each day on a worldwide level. However, there is a potential dark 
side. Many create corporations to fulfill genuine business purposes; in the 
U.S. alone, for example, states allow people and entities to create companies 
without knowing the true identity of the company’s beneficial owners.4 The 
same is true around the world in other jurisdictions to a lesser or greater 
extent, especially jurisdictions considered to be tax havens.  
In 2013, the International Consortium of Investigative Reporters 
disclosed almost two million documents that highlighted the problem of 
identifying owners of company vehicles. 5  This extensive set of leaked 
documents revealed the corporate ownership of “thousands of companies and 
trusts set up in the British Virgin Islands and Cook Islands.” 6  These 
previously anonymous owners included “Asian politicians to Canadian 
lawyers – and no fewer than 4,000 Americans.”7 Global Witness, a UK-based 
non-governmental organization, conducted an investigation into hidden 
company ownership and found troubling consequences of the non-disclosure 
of company ownership. For example, in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC), the government sold the state’s mining assets at below market value 
to companies registered in the British Virgin Islands, a territory with no 
formal laws on disclosing company ownership. 8  The owners of these 
companies were kept secret. However, the Global Witness investigation 
                                                
3 Dean Kalant, Who’s in Charge Here?: Requiring More Transparency in Corporate 
America: Advancements in Beneficial Ownership for Privately Held Companies, 42 
J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1049, 1050 (2009) (citing Staff of Permanent Subcomm. on 
Investigations, Comm. on Homeland Security and Gov't Affairs, Levin-Coleman-
Obama Introduced Bill to Stop Misuse of U.S. Companies (May 1, 2008)).  
4 Id. at 1051.   
5 Max Biedermann, G8 Principles: Identifying the Anonymous, 11 B.Y.U. INT'L L. & 
MGMT. REV. 72, 73-74 (2015).  
6 Id. at 315 (citing Leaky Devils, THE ECONOMIST (Apr. 13, 2013), available at 
http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21576146-tax-havens-start-
reassess-their-business-models-leaky-devils). 
7 Id . 
8 Company Ownership: Which places Are the Most and Least Transparent?, GLOBAL 
WITNESS 2 (2013) available at 
https://www.globalwitness.org/sites/default/files/library/GW_CA_Company%20Own
ership%20Paper_download.pdf [hereinafter Global Witness Report]. 
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discovered that these companies in the British Virgin Islands were associated 
with an Israeli billionaire who was a friend of the DRC’s president.9 The state 
mining assets, which effectively belong to the nation and its people, were 
sold in the open market at above commercial valuation.10 The transactions 
thus created profits for the companies and most likely, the president of the 
DRC, but resulted in a loss of nearly $1.3 billion to the nation of Congo and 
its people.11  
There are many more cases similar to the above situation. In 2008, a 
Financial Times analyst reported on a “secret” method, where the carmaker 
Porsche used “equity derivatives to conceal economic ownership of shares 
(‘hidden ownership’)”12 to build up a large stake in Volkswagen. A similar 
phenomenon, “the exercise of voting power without corresponding economic 
interest (‘empty voting’),”13 stems from the lack of strong and consistent 
company ownership disclosure rules. Moreover, in 2010, the United States 
Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (the Subcommittee) 
submitted a report on keeping foreign corruption outside the United States.14 
In its report, the Subcommittee highlighted the histories of four cases  
regarding foreign corruption, including one case where the son of the 
president of Equatorial Guinea set up shell companies in the State of 
California as well as in the British Virgin Islands (BVI) to purchase a $30 
million dollar mansion and a $37.5 million dollar Gulfstream jet, despite 
having a mere modest income.15 The US Senate Subcommittee’s 2010 report 
was consistent with the 2011 World Bank study of 213 large-scale corruption 
cases, which found that over 70% corruption cases involved the use of shell 
companies.16 This scenario in particular highlights the issue of potential 
                                                
9 Id.  
10 Id. at 2-3. 
11 Id. 
12 Michael C. Schouten, The Case for Mandatory Ownership Disclosure, 15 STAN. 
J.L. BUS. & FIN. 127, 130 (2009). 
13 Id. 
14  See Keeping Foreign Corruption out of the United States: Four Case Histories: 
Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations, Homeland Sec. & Gov’t 
Affairs, United States Senate (2010) available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111shrg56840/html/CHRG-
111shrg56840.htm.  
15 Id., at 2. 
16 Poverty, Corruption, and Anonymous Companies, GLOBAL WITNESS 2 (2014), 
available at http://www.globalwitness.org/library/anonymous-companies-global-
witness-briefing [hereinafter Anonymous Companies]; see The Misuse of Corporate 
Vehicles, Including Trust and Company Service Providers, FINANCIAL ACTION TASK 
FORCE (2006), http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Misuse%20of%20Corporate%20Vehicles%20i
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financial crimes associated with hidden company ownership. Additionally, in 
September 2013, the BBC News reported on the issue of tax evasion and 
hidden company ownership by highlighting how the then-209th richest man 
in America, who had an estimated net worth of $2.9 billion, “hid more than 
$3 million (£ 1.9 million) of income in a secret Swiss bank account.”17 
Each of the above events highlights the dangers of the absence of any 
mandatory requirement of corporate ownership disclosure, as well as the lack 
of enforcing the existing rules of beneficial ownership disclosure. It is a 
potential minefield laced with a deadly combination of low corporate and 
financial innovation, questionable profit, and unsustainable company 
practices that can lead to self-dealing (e.g., asset stripping, related party 
transactions, and share dilutions), tax evasion, money laundering, terrorism 
financing, and other financial crimes resulting from and encouraging the non-
disclosure of a company’s ownership.18  
The increasing risks of hidden company ownership finally reached 
the attention of high-level political leaders at the 2013 G8 Summit in Lough 
Erne, Northern Ireland. The G8 countries (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, 
Japan, Russia, United States of America, and the United Kingdom ) 
announced the “G8 Principles,” a set of eight principles, or a “beneficial 
ownership action plan,”19 designed to improve the transparency of company 
ownership as well as combat the misuse and abuse of companies via legal 
arrangements.  
This article focuses on the relationship between transparency (in 
particular, transparency of company ownership), corporate governance of 
                                                                                                                
ncluding%20Trusts%20and%20Company%20Services%20Providers.pdf (stating that 
a shell company has no viable operations or assets); see also The Role of Domestic 
Shell Companies in Financial Crime and Money Laundering: Limited Liability 
Companies, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY FINANCIAL CRIMES ENFORCEMENT 
NETWORK 2-4 (2006), 
http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/files/LLCAssessment_FINAL.pdf. 
17 Beanie Babies creator Ty Warner to admit tax evasion, BBC NEWS (September 18, 
2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-24155274. 
18 Biedermann, supra note 5, at 72; see also John G. Edwards, Registered Agents 
Fight Bill Requiring Corporate Ownership Records, L. V. REV. J. (May 3, 2008), 
available at 2008 WLNR 8389953 (hereinafter Registered Agents) (explaining that 
while not all corporations and LLCs are created for illegitimate reasons, lack of 
beneficial owner transparency has caused numerous problems relating to money 
laundering, tax evasion, terrorism, and other misconduct). 
19 Biedermann, supra note 5, at 74; see also Global Witness Report, supra note 8, at 
2; G8 Action Plan Principles to Prevent the Misuse of Companies and Legal 
Arrangements, GOV.UK (2013),  
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/20753
2/G8-Action-Plan-principles-to-prevent-the-misuse-of-companies-and-legal-
arrangements.pdf  [hereinafter G8 Action Plan Principles]. 
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publicly traded companies and capital markets. The central question of this 
article can be stated as follows: if requirements of ownership transparency are 
imposed on companies, does this create opportunities for effective 
governance of equity capital markets or does this impose constraints on 
corporate performance?  
Following the introduction in Part I of the article, Part II analyses the 
relationship between capital markets and company ownership disclosure. Part 
III evaluates the European Union Directive on Transparency (EU 
Transparency Directive), which is considered one of the most comprehensive 
directives aimed at increasing disclosure of company beneficial ownership 
across the European Union. Part IV of the article focuses on initiatives in the 
United States that aim at improving beneficial ownership transparency, 
including the current requirements under the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Act 1934 and the most recent reintroduction of a proposed bill on corporate 
transparency called the Incorporation Transparency and Law Enforcement 
Assistance Act (“ITLEAA” or “the Levin Bill”) in August 2013.20 Part V 
shifts the focus from the EU and U.S. towards other international efforts in 
mandating disclosure of beneficial ownership, such as efforts by the 
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 
recommendations by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), and ownership 
disclosure regimes of nations other than the EU and U.S. Part VI consolidates 
the analysis in the previous sections of the article to highlight some of the 
outstanding issues related to beneficial ownership transparency requirements 
and its impact on corporate performance, if any. To that end, Part VI of the 
article makes policy recommendations for addressing these outstanding 
issues. Finally, Part VII provides concluding remarks. 
I. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CAPITAL MARKETS AND 
COMPANY OWNERSHIP DISCLOSURE 
A. Building Strong Capital Markets  
In his 2001 article on strong securities markets, Professor Bernard 
Black argued that establishing “the preconditions for a strong market for 
common stocks and other securities” was a challenge for all economies.21 
One need only refer to those recent 2015 events in China’s stock exchanges 
                                                
20 Incorporation Transparency and Law Enforcement Assistance Act, S. 1465, 113th 
Cong. (2013) available at https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/senate-
bill/1465.  
21  Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities 
Markets, 48 UCLA L. REV. 781, 781 (April 2001). 
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to learn that such challenge is a genuine issue, even today. Professor Black 
argues that in order to establish a strong market of securities, the complex 
web of legal and market institutions must address two issues of investor 
protection, namely ensuring that minority shareholders “(1) receive good 
information about the value of a company's business and (2) have confidence 
that a company's managers and controlling shareholders won't cheat them out 
of most or all of the value of their investment.”22 By pointing out the above 
issues, Professor Black is more concerned about the transparency of company 
information, as well as potential issues arising out of the unsavoury conducts 
of the company directors and controlling shareholders that may impact the 
company’s value and their ripple effects on capital markets. These two 
requirements are also at the heart of the debate on beneficial ownership 
disclosure and transparency.23  
For the purposes of this article, capital markets are “meeting places 
where those who require additional capital seek out others who wish to invest 
their excess.”24 They can be in the form of long-term debt or equity-backed 
securities. Capital markets include equity markets (stocks) and debt markets 
(bonds). As used in this abstract, equity markets refer to stock markets or 
exchanges (securities), where shares of a company are publicly traded, 
subject to a variety of regulations, codes of conduct, and charters.  
Capital markets can be categorized into primary and secondary 
markets. Primary markets serve as “a market for creating and originating new 
financial instruments.”25 Secondary markets are used for trading existing 
financial instruments and products.26 Equity is the price that investors (e.g., 
lenders, shareholders) will pay for a company’s stock. The value of such 
equity depends on the company’s corporate governance system, which 
effectively is an equity contract outlining the terms of the equity investment. 
                                                
22 Id. 
23 There is a distinction between disclosure and transparency for while regulations 
may require issuers and shareholders to disclose their economic interest in a company 
to intermediaries or agencies, that information may not be transparent to the issuing 
company or transparent to the public. The level of transparency is key to the debate. 
24  ANDREW CHISOLM, AN INTRODUCTION TO CAPITAL MARKETS: PRODUCTS, 
STRATEGIES, PARTICIPANTS, 1 (John Wiley & Sons, Ltd (2002) (While these meeting 
places can be physical meeting places, they are now increasing virtual or online 
meeting places.) Note: Capital markets are distinct from money markets, which are 
aimed at more short-term loans and financing. See also Avnita Lakhani, China’s 
Shadow Banking Industry and Impact on Capital Markets: Ignoring the Lessons of 
the Past (publication forthcoming in the JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
LAW (August 2015)). 
25 CHISOLM, supra note 26, at 2. 
26 Id. 
128                               Chi.-Kent J. Int’l & Comp. L.                 Vol. XVI 
 
 
When a company has good corporate governance, the value of its stock is 
likely to be higher and the cost of borrowing capital lower.27 
On a broader scale, good corporate governance ensures that markets 
and enterprises may function efficiently and in accordance with society’s 
goals. 28  A healthy corporate governance system allows stakeholders to 
monitor the company’s performance, and to adopt and execute measures to 
deal with poor performance. In addition, a sustainable corporate governance 
framework can promote investor confidence,29 assist the company in meeting 
investor expectations, allow the exercising of shareholder rights in an 
effective way,30 encourage sound decision making on behalf of the company, 
and help regulators and agencies deal with systemic issues such as the ability 
to “determine the origins of investment flows, to prevent money laundering 
and tax evasion and to settle issues of corporate accountability.”31  
Transparency is essential to achieve good corporate governance 
because it provides  the ability to monitor company performance through 
disclosure of finances, profits, losses, and other related reporting. Without 
transparency, it would be impossible for a country to support equity markets 
and ensure the stability of industry. As argued by Vermeulen, “a good 
corporate governance infrastructure should combine transparency, 
accountability and integrity and this requires knowledge of beneficial 
                                                
27  See, e.g., Allen Ferrell, The Case for Mandatory Disclosure in Securities 
Regulation around the World, 2 BROOK. J. CORP., FIN. & COM. L. 81, 93 (2007) 
(discussing the relationship between market efficiency, good corporate governance, 
and lower cost of capital).   
28 Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Beneficial Ownership and Control: A Comparative Study 
Disclosure, Information and Enforcement 5 (March 2012), available at 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k4dkhwckbzv-en. This paper was discussed in a panel as 
part of a technical seminar of the OECD Russia Corporate Governance Roundtable 
organized for March 2012 in Moscow, Russian Federation.  
29 See, e.g., Schouten, supra note 12, at 132 (quoting the first recital of Directive 
2004/109/EC, On the Harmonisation of Transparency Requirements in Relation to 
Information About Issuers Whose Securities are Admitted to Trading on a Regulated 
Market, O.J. (L 390) 38 (2004) [hereinafter Transparency Directive] to show how 
one of the purposes of the EU Transparency directive is to boost investor 
confidence); see also Merritt B. Fox, Civil Liability and Mandatory Disclosure, 109 
COLUM. L. REV. 237, 253 (2009). 
30 Schouten, supra note 12, at 134 (citing the Transparency Directive in terms of its 
goal of “enabl[ing] investors ‘to acquire or dispose of shares in full knowledge of 
changes in the voting structure; it should also enhance effective control of share 
issuers and overall market transparency of important capital movements’”); 
Transparency Directive, supra note 31,at 18. 
31 Vermeulen, supra note 30, at 5. 
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ownership.”32 In turn, ownership disclosure improves market efficiency and 
corporate governance.33  
This knowledge consists of not only the identity of the controlling 
owners (or, as argued by some, all owners), but also knowledge of the 
controlling structures of listed companies. Knowledge of beneficial owners 
and the control structures of listed companies must then be accompanied by 
effective investigation and enforcement mechanisms regarding disclosed 
information about beneficial ownership.34  
Ownership transparency refers to disclosure regarding majority 
shareholders 35  in particular, but can also refer to disclosure regarding 
minority shareholders for the purposes of protecting such shareholders. As 
seen by recent events, majority shareholders can play an activist or pacifist 
role as owners of a company, thus affecting the company’s performance. As 
highlighted by Professor Gilson, a company’s performance can suffer “a 
controlling shareholder’s divergence of earnings or opportunities to itself.”36  
Transparency and disclosure of ownership provides numerous benefits 
to the capital market and society as a whole. First, it can facilitate better 
management of the company and produce a positive impact on capital 
markets.37 For example, ownership disclosure can improve market efficiency 
by “creating transparency of the voting structure and of changes in the voting 
structure…enable[ing] investors to anticipate agency costs and to assess the 
implications for the value of a firm's share,”38 and inform share price as well 
as ensure the accuracy of that price “by creating transparency of economic 
                                                
32 Vermeulen, supra note 30, at 2; Gilson, supra note 1 at 6, 7 (stating that two forms 
of transparency, financial disclosure and ownership transparency, are required for 
effective corporate governance); OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD) 51 
(2004) (stating that ownership disclosure is “one of the basic rights' of investors”). 
33 See Schouten, supra note 12, at 133 (defining an efficient market as one “in which 
prices always fully reflect available information.”); Gilson, supra note 1, at 6; see 
also Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical 
Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970). 
34 Vermeulen, supra note 30, at 15. 
35 Gilson, supra note 1, at 6 (defining ownership transparency such that “companies 
disclose the identity of shareholders who own significant amounts of corporate stock, 
as required in the United States by the Securities Exchange Act and in the European 
Community by the Tranparency Directive.”) 
36 Id. 
37 As an example, once can look at recent events in July 2015 where China’s stock 
market plunged and suffered a rout.  There, the majority of controlling shareholders 
are state-owned companies although in Shanghai’s stock exchange, the players are 
mainly private investors in company stock. 
38 Schouten, supra note 12, at 180. 
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interests of shareholders, of trading interest and of the size of the free float.39 
Second, ownership disclosure can improve enforcement within firms of both 
concentrated ownership and dispersed ownership. In firms with concentrated 
ownership, or “blockholder systems,” such as those found in  Europe, Asia, 
and most other capitalist economies,40 disclosure of beneficial ownership 
allows for better “monitoring of the controlling shareholder, thus preventing 
extraction of private benefits.”41 In firms with dispersed ownership or so-
called market systems characterized by “small and numerous shareholdings, 
liquid trading markets…high frequency trading and rapid and continuous 
changes in share ownership,”42 disclosure of beneficial ownership improves 
enforcement “by facilitating the market for corporate control, the mechanism 
through which management is disciplined by takeovers and the threat 
thereof”43  and by “facilitat[ing] communication among shareholders and 
between companies and their shareholders.”44  
However, a counter-argument often made is that ownership 
transparency requirements may unduly burden the controlling shareholders 
and negatively impact corporate performance since such ownership 
transparency requirements may disclose shareholders’ financial standing, 
prevent activism necessary to promote corporate growth, and result in a level 
of corporate politics that is detrimental to effective corporate governance. In 
the hands of the unscrupulous, too much information can become a sword that 
cuts the shield of good intentions and good corporate governance. Currently 
the debate and laws surrounding the requirements of disclosure of company 
ownership have mainly focused on ‘beneficial ownership’ transparency. 
However, clearly defining ‘beneficial ownership’ is a difficult task, and 
enforcing sufficient transparency requirements can be more complicated than 
expected.  
                                                
39Id.; see, e.g. , Merritt B. Fox et al., Law, Share Price Accuracy and Economic 
Performance: The New Evidence, 102 MICH. L. REV. 331, 348-368 (2003) (studying 
the relationship between strict disclosure requirements and finding that “[t]he results 
of the study suggest that share prices became more informed as a result of the 
enhanced disclosure requirements, which supports the view that mandatory issuer 
disclosure can increase share price accuracy and share price informedness.”); see also 
Schouten, supra note 12, at 134.  
40 Vermeulen, supra note 30, at 7 (discussing the ‘vertical agency problem’ in firms 
with concentrated ownership or blockholder systems). 
41 Schouten, supra note 12, at 180. 
42 Vermeulen, supra note 30, at 7, 18 (discussing the ‘vertical agency problem’ in 
firms with dispersed ownership or market systems). 
43 Schouten, supra note 12, at 180. 
44 Id. 
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B. Defining and Disclosing Beneficial Ownership 
The United Kingdom created the legal concept of beneficial 
ownership under its trust laws.45  A beneficiary is defined as one who 
“ultimately controls an asset and can benefit from it.”46 The Financial Action 
Task Force (FATF) defines beneficial ownership as “the natural person(s) 
who ultimately owns or controls a customer and/or the natural person on 
whose behalf a transaction is being conducted…also includes those persons 
who exercise ultimate effective control over a legal person or arrangement.”47 
In the United States, Rule 13d-3(a) of the Securities and Exchange 
Act of 1934 defines a beneficial owner of a security as:  
Any person who, directly or indirectly, through any contract, 
arrangement, understanding, relationship, or otherwise has or 
shares: (i) voting power which includes the power to vote, or 
to direct the voting of, such security; and/or, (ii) investment 
power which includes the power to dispose, or to direct the 
disposition of, such security.48  
 
However, the newly proposed Incorporation Transparency and Law 
Enforcement Assistance Act of 2013 (the “Levin Bill” or “ITLEAA”) does 
not adopt the same definition of beneficial owner as the Securities & 
Exchange Act of 1934. According to ITLEAA, a beneficial owner is defined 
as “an individual who has a level of control over, or entitlement to, the funds 
or assets of a corporation or [LLC] that, as a practical matter, enables the 
individual, directly or indirectly, to control, manage, or direct the corporation 
or [LLC].”49  
In the European Union (EU), the EU Transparency Directive extends 
disclosure by the beneficial owner, which extends to encompass a variety of 
definitions. For example, as explained by Schouten, the EU Transparency 
                                                
45 Biedermann, supra note 3, at 74. 
46 Id. (quoting Emile Van Der Does De Willebois, Emily H. Halter, Robert A. 
Harrison, Ji Won Park & J.C. Sharman, The Puppet Masters, 18 (2010), available at 
http://issuu.com/world.bank.publications/docs/9780821388945). 
47 International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of 
Terrorism & Proliferation - the FATF Recommendations, FINANCIAL ACTION TASK 
FORCE ON MONEY LAUNDERING 110 (2012), 
http://www.fatfgafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF_Recom
mendations.pdf    
48 United States Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-3(a) 
(2010); see also Vermeulen, supra note 30, at 21. 
49  Kalant, supra note 3, at 1051 (quoting ITLEAA, S. 569, 111th Cong. 
§3(a)(1)(a)(1)(e)(1) (2009)) (August 2013 was the third time that ITLEAA was 
introduced before Congress. It was first introduced in May 2008 and re-introduced in 
March 2009.); see also Vermeulen, supra note 30, at 21; Schouten, supra note 12, at 
164; J. W. Verret, Terrorism Finance, Business Associations, and the “Incorporation 
Transparency Act”, 70 LA. L. REV. 857, 859 (Spring 2010). 
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Directive uses “various criteria…to try to capture the beneficial owner, such 
as ‘power to exercise dominant influence or control,’ ‘discretion,’ 
‘instruction,’” and “‘independently.’” 50  Disclosure obligations extend to 
parties who have access to voting rights,51 including those who hold shares 
indirectly through controlled entities. Furthermore, disclosure requirements 
apply to “parties acting in concert or to parties on whose behalf shares are 
held by a third party.” 52  Parties who hold equity derivatives are also 
considered beneficial owners and are subject to the disclosure requirements.53 
A final noteworthy definition of beneficial owner is by 
Computershare, a listed company that identifies itself as “a global market 
leader in transfer agency and share registration, employee equity plans, proxy 
solicitation and stakeholder communications.”54 In Computershare’s March 
2015 international market analysis of 14 countries55 with respect to, among 
many items, the transparency of share ownership, the report defines 
beneficial owner as simply “an investor who owns an interest in a security.”56 
According to Computershare’s definition, the beneficial owner may hold 
legal title to the shares or has contracted with an intermediary and is thus an 
indirect holder.57 In either case, the beneficial owner “may be entitled to not 
only monetary rights but also voting rights “depending on local laws and 
agreements.” 58  The report also distinguishes between a non-objecting 
beneficial owner (NOBO) and an objecting beneficial owner (OBO), where a 
NOBO consents to being disclosed to an issuer as a beneficial owner while an 
OBO refuses to disclose its identity to the issuer by an intermediary. 59 
                                                
50 Schouten, supra note 12, at 163. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 163-164, n 84. 
53 Id. at 164. 
54 Clare Corney, Kirsten Van Rooijen, and Amanda Kaut, Transparency of Share 
Ownership, Shareholder Communications and Voting in Global Capital Markets, 




Votinginglobalcapitalmarkets_12032014.pdf (Note that the report was done in 
collaboration with Georgeson, a company which identifies itself in the report as “the 
world’s foremost provider of strategic shareholder services to corporations and 
shareholder groups working to influence corporate strategy”). 
55 Corney et al. supra note 56 (The 14 countries included in the market analysis 
included: Australia, China, Hong Kong, India, Japan, France, Germany, Italy, United 
Kingdom, Spain, Sweden, Russia, United States, and Canada). 
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From the myriad definitions above, two key observations are 
noteworthy. First, if a valid argument for disclosure of beneficial ownership 
is made in order to “cure the illness” of hidden company ownership, there 
must be an easy way to understand and clarify the definition of “beneficial 
ownership,” which shall apply across all jurisdictions. Specifically, the 
definition must take into account three key elements: voting power, control 
power, and investment power. Second, from the perspective of effective 
disclosure and enforcement, the definition needs to encompass a range of 
voting, control, and/or investment power that makes the beneficial owner 
subject to disclosure regulation, investigation, and prosecution. Currently, the 
definitions are either too all-encompassing, or they are difficult to track and 
enforce.  
C. Defining and Enforcing Transparency 
Backer defines transparency as applicable in two arenas. Within an 
organization or community, transparency “enhances its operation and 
disciplines its members.”60 Outside an organization, transparency can be used 
“to enhance legitimacy (norm) and accountability (technique) among 
stakeholders who have an interest in but not a direct participation in the 
operation of the enterprise.” 61  Defining transparency in the context of 
mandatory beneficial ownership is also a challenge, yet it is in defining the 
level of desired transparency that the concept of beneficial ownership 
disclosure can have any effective and enforceable meaning. 
For example, Computershare’s 2015 market analysis report 
distinguishes between “disclosures required to be made by investors when 
they trigger certain ownership levels, specified by legislation, and issuer 
rights to proactively demand identification of their investor.”62  Because 
Computershare’s 2015 report focused on the latter, namely, an issuer’s right 
to demand a list of their investors, its definition of transparency is “visibility 
of the underlying beneficial owners of shares to an issuer.”63 This appears to 
suggest that the issuers and investors have the ability to access a private 
registry. However, according to Global Witness, transparency measures the 
                                                
60 Larry Catá Backer, Transparency Between Norm, Technique, and Property in 
International Law and Governance: The Example of Corporate Disclosure Regimes 
and Environmental Impacts, 22 MINN. J. INT'L L. 1, 4 (Winter 2013). 
61 Id. 
62 Corney et al., supra note 58, at 1. 
63 Id. at 35-36. 
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“need to be exactly that: transparent.”64 As argued by Global Witness, this 
presumes the existence of a public registry since a private registry “no matter 
how well implemented, is simply not that much help.”65  Under Global 
Witness’ definition of a public registry, details of company ownership would 
be available to and accessible by everyone in the world, including issuers, 
investors, journalists, and ordinary citizens, without the boundaries of 
jurisdictional rules and regulations. 
The theory of establishing transparency of beneficial ownership 
through a public registry garners further support from the second principle of 
the G8 Principles, the UK’s proposed action plan on beneficial ownership as 
outlined in a discussion paper called The Transparency & Trust: Enhancing 
the Transparency of UK Company Ownership and Increasing Trust in UK 
Business, the proposed Levin Bill of the US Congress, and the EU’s 
Transparency Directive, which foresees that such information will be 
“disseminated…to the public throughout the Community.”66 However, for 
each of the above-mentioned jurisdictions, the definition of public registry is 
akin to a national, centralized registry. As acknowledged by the UK, for 
example, it “cannot require overseas companies operating in the UK to 
disclose beneficial ownership information to a UK registry.”67 It is likely that 
other jurisdictions face similar restrictions in addition to the costs for both 
issuers and investors in meeting the requirements for a private or public 
registry. 
Despite the support for transparency, it is clear that the level and 
nature of transparency with respect to beneficial ownership disclosure has not 
reached a point of consensus. Such consensus, to a greater degree towards an 
international public registry, is important if the benefits of mandatory 
company disclosure are to outweigh the costs.  
                                                
64 Global Witness Report, supra note 8, at 4. 
65 Id. 
66 Biedermann, supra note 3, at 89-91 (discussing the plans outlined by some G8 
countries with respect to a public registry); see also Fabrice Demarigny and 
Christophe Clerc, Transparency Directive Assessment Report: Executive summary 
and possible improvements, VI MAZARS (2009), 
http://ec.europa.eu/finance/securities/docs/transparency/report-
application_summary_en.pdf. 
67 Transparency & Trust: Enhancing the Transparency of UK Company Ownership 
and Increasing Trust in UK Business, DEPARTMENT FOR BUSINESS INNOVATION AND 
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II. EU TRANSPARENCY DIRECTIVE AND OWNERSHIP 
DISCLOSURE 
The European Union (EU) was created through the Maastricht Treaty 
of 1992, also known as the Treaty on European Union (TEU). Twelve 
original “High Contracting Parties” (Member Nations) signed the TEU 
onFebruary 7, 1992, and the TEU entered into force on November 1, 1993.68 
The TEU also facilitated the creation of the Economic and Monetary Union, 
which led to the creation of the euro currency in January 1999.69 However, 
the European Communities,70 consisting of various EU countries, existed as 
early as the late 1970s, well before the creation of the European Union.  
The EU forged the pathway for a mandatory ownership disclosure 
scheme beginning in 1988 via the “Major Holdings Disclosure Directive.”71 
Council Directive 88/627/EEC imposed an obligation to disclose major 
shareholdings when they were acquired and when they were disposed of.72 
However, due to certain limitations in its application, the Major Holdings 
Disclosure Directive was repealed and replaced in 2004 by Directive 
2004/109/EC (the “Transparency Directive”).73 The Transparency Directive 
was later amended in 2013 by Directive 2013/50/EU to take into account 
several improvements such as issuer obligations, and to make regulated 
markets more attractive to small and medium-sized businesses.74 Under the 
                                                
68  See Civitas, EU Factsheet: Treaty of Maastricht, CIVITAS.ORG.UK (2014), 
http://www.civitas.org.uk/eufacts/FSTREAT/TR3.php [hereinafter EU Factsheet] 
69 Id.; Timeline: the unfolding eurozone crisis, BBC NEWS.COM (June 13, 2012), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/business13856580 (citing January 1, 1999 as the date 
when the euro currency ‘officially came into existence’). 
70  Greek Profile - Timeline, BBC.COM (August 11, 2015), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17373216 (noting the existence of the 
European Communities, which was subsequently subsumed by the European Union 
and Greece, an EU country as being one of its members in 1981).  
71 Schouten, supra note 12, at 132 (citing Council Directive 88/627/EEC, On the 
Information to be Published when a Major Holding in a Listed Company is Acquired 
or Disposed Of, 1988 O.J. (L 348) 62 (1988)); Holger Fleischer and Klaus Ulrich 
Schmolke, The reform of the Transparency Directive: Minimum or Full 
Harmonisation of Ownership Disclosure?, 12(1) EUROPEAN BUS. ORG. L.REV., 121-
145 (2011)  
(discussing the ‘Transparency Directive 1988’). 
72 Schouten, supra note 12, at 132; Vermeulen, supra note 30, at 17. 
73 Schouten, supra note 12, at 132 (citing the Transparency Directive); see also 
Fleischer and Schmolke, supra note 75, at 125-126 (discussing the ‘Transparency 
Directive 2004’). 
74 See generally Directive 2013/50/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 22 October 2013 amending Directive 2004/109/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on the Harmonisation of Transparency Requirements in Relation 
to Information About Issuers Whose Securities are Admitted to Trading on a 
Regulated Market, Directive 2003/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the public or 
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Transparency Directive, persons or entities who “hold or have access to 
voting rights should disclose their major holdings in listed companies”75 in 
the sense that they must provide “timely information about the acquisition or 
disposal of voting rights of listed companies… based on thresholds starting at 
5%, continuing at intervals of 5% until 30% of voting rights.”76 In addition, 
the Transparency Directive requires both periodic and ad hoc reporting. For 
example, Article 12(2) requires that, when there is a change in a major 
shareholding, the issuer must file a notification within four days of when the 
shareholding falls or exceeds the thresholds in Article 9.77 Subsequently, the 
listing company must inform the public within three days of receiving the 
notice of the change.78 The notification requirement also applies to various 
classes of shares such as warrants, convertible bonds and some derivatives.79  
According to Schouten, the disclosure regime of the Transparency 
Directive improves the transparency of voting structure as well as any 
changes in such voting structure, which may signal a potential shift in 
corporate control. 80  The Transparency Directive regime also enhances 
transparency of important capital movements such as economic interests, 
trading interests, and the size of the free float.81 In addition, Schouten argues 
that the Transparency Directive plays an important role in improving 
corporate governance by allowing investors to anticipate and reduce agency 
costs, and by addressing other agency-related problems.82 
In 2009, Mazars published a report on the findings of an assessment 
of the EU Transparency Directive. The study was part of the European 
Commission’s obligations under Article 33 of the Transparency Directive.83 
Mazars’ methodology consisted of online questionnaires (with a 12% global 
response rate), shareholder interviews, financial reporting compliance 
                                                                                                                
admitted to trading and Commission Directive 2007/14/EC laying down detailed 
rules for the implementation of certain provisions of Directive 2004/109/EC. 
75 Schouten, supra note 12, at 132. 
76 Vermeulen, supra note 30, at 17 (citing Article 9 of the Transparency Directive). 
77 Id. 
78 Id. (citing Article 9 and Article 12(2) of the Transparency Directive). 
79 Id. 
80 Schouten, supra note 12, at 134-148. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 148-156 (discussing agency costs and problems in relation to lack of 
transparency of beneficial owners); Vermeulen, supra note 30, at 7-8, 12-14, and 26 
(discussing horizontal and vertical agency cost issues). 
83  Demarigny and Clerc, supra note 70, at VI (discussing harmonization of 
transparency requirements, particularly under EU Directive 2004/109/EC 
(Transparency Directive).  
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reviews and legal implementation reviews.84 The study included feedback 
from fifteen EU Member States and six non-EU Members, including the 
U.S., Japan, China, India, Hong Kong and Switzerland. 85  Stakeholder 
representatives in the study included issuers of shares and debt or other 
securities, institutional investors, retail investors associations, financial 
analysts and financial intermediaries.86 
While a strong majority of respondents (65%) reported that the 
Transparency Directive was clear and met the objectives of “providing 
accurate, comprehensive, and timely information to the market,”87 only 32% 
of non-EU stakeholders had sufficient knowledge, interests, or understanding 
of the obligations under the Transparency Directive.88 And only 16% of non-
EU nations “believe that the Directive provides sufficient clarity and 
predictability.”89 Considering the non-EU nations in the study are some of the 
largest and most developed economies in the world, it does not bode well for 
the EU’s desire to convince the world of the attractiveness of the single 
market, particularly in terms of transparency.90 Respondents who expressed 
positive views about the Directive creating a favorable impression of the 
single market consisted of 66% of non-EU institutional investors.91 
Interestingly enough, in contrast to Schouten’s views, the study 
results related to information and notification of major holdings under the 
Transparency Directive were “the most problematic according to the 
perceptions of stakeholders and the legal assessment of the legal operation in 
Member States.”92 While 78% of financial analysts and institutional investors 
found the disclosure of major holdings useful for investment purposes and 
58% found the disclosure and notification obligations to not impose an 
unreasonable burden,93 a detailed analysis of responses found several areas of 
concern with respect to disclosure, notification, and enforcement. 
First, many EU member states have adopted more stringent 
ownership disclosure thresholds, leading to a lack of harmonization in 
                                                
84 Demarigny and Clerc, supra note 70, at VI. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. It is important to note that the Report does not specify the total number of 
individual respondents in the sample size and the total respondents across all methods 
of collecting the data. 
87 Id. at VII. 




92 Id. at XI. 
93 Id. 
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implementing the Transparency Directive. 94  This lack of harmonization 
means that the notification process is neither simpler nor less burdensome 
under the Transparency Directive. .95 Second, respondents reported that the 
unclear provisions of the Transparency Directive, combined with financial 
innovation such as “empty voting,” lending of voting rights, cash-settled 
equity swaps and cash-settled contracts,96 “allows certain market players to 
circumvent transparency requirements,”97 thus making the Directive “too 
rule-based and not sufficiently principle-based.”98 
Compared with Mazars’ study, Vermeulen’s 2012 comparative 
analysis of five jurisdictions with respect to their disclosure of control 
structures and beneficial owners provides insight into whether each 
jurisdiction had sufficient transparency of beneficial ownership by 
international standards. In his study, Vermeulen includes Italy as the EU 
representative country implementing Transparency Directive. As to 
disclosure of control structures and transparency of beneficial disclosure, 
Italy deviates from the Transparency Directive’s minimum threshold of 5% 
for the first threshold reporting requirements.99 In Italy, the first threshold is 
2%, followed by 5%, and then increments of 5% up to 95% of holding.100 
However, Vermeulen indicates that countries such as Italy and Malaysia 
“have taken or are taking measures to amend the rules”101 by imposing a 
stricter threshold towards the international norm of 5% as the minimum 
starting threshold for reporting beneficial ownership. In addition, Italy’s 
securities regulator, CONSOB, appears to be moving towards a stricter 
disclosure regime. For example, CONSOB includes cash-settled equity 
derivatives in its reporting requirement, and mandates that the ultimate 
controlling person shall notify the major holding within five days of reaching 
a particular ownership threshold.102 CONSOB would ultimately verify the 
                                                
94 Id.; see also Fleischer and Schmolke, supra note 75, at 125-126 (discussing 
harmonization issues related to the Transparency Directive in general). 
95 Demarigny and Clerc, supra note 70, at XI; See also Fleischer and Schmolke, 
supra note 75. 
96 Demarigny and Clerc, supra note 70, at XI. 
97 Id. 
98 Id.; see also id. at XII-XIV (on recommendations for dealing with some of the 
above-mentioned issues).  
99 Vermeulen, supra note 30, at 20. 
100 Id. (citing the Italian Consolidated Law on Finance and the CONSOB, the Italian 
securities and regulatory agency). 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 21. 
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reported information, post the information on its website, and ensure the data 
is publicly accessible.103  
In addition to the Mazars and Vermeulen studies, the 2013 Global 
Witness Report on G8 countries and hidden company ownership discovered 
that a public registry is an important criteria in assessing whether a country 
has high transparency of beneficial ownership disclosure. At the time of the 
Global Witness Report, nearly all G8 nations, including Italy, Germany, 
France and the United Kingdom, did not have a publicly accessible registry 
of company beneficial owners, though such data appeared to be retrievable 
privately or through a private registry.104 
In addition, Computershare’s 2015 market analysis report on 
transparency of share ownership in six European nations105 is worth noting, 
especially since transparency is defined in terms of whether an issuer (not a 
beneficial owner or shareholder) has visibility to the underlying beneficial 
owner of shares or can demand such disclosure. According to 
Computershare’s study, by international standards, France, Germany, United 
Kingdom and Sweden are rated as being “highly transparent market[s] of 
share ownership for issuers,”106 with issuers having a high degree of visibility 
into the beneficial owners and their shares. In each of these countries, 
visibility of beneficial ownership can be obtained through a shared register or 
through disclosure procedures under the law, as long as the shareholders are 
NOBOs (non-objecting beneficial owners). Comparatively, in Italy, issuers 
only have full transparency of investors at times of certain corporate actions 
such as annual general meetings.107 However, Italian law does give a right to 
issuers to request that intermediaries disclose beneficial owners, as long as 
there are NOBOs and the issuer has adopted enabling by-laws allowing such 
disclosure.108 Finally, Spain is largely classified as a bearer shares market 
(versus a registered shares market) with a “moderate level of transparency of 
share ownership for issuers due to the disclosure of Spanish intermediaries’ 
client account holding”.109 Visibility of local investors is also higher than of 
foreign investors. At the same time, Article §497 of the Corporation Act 
                                                
103 Id. 
104 Global Witness Report, supra note 8, at 6.  
105 See generally Corney et al., supra note 56 (the six European nations included 
France, Germany, Italy, United Kingdom, Spain, and Sweden). 
106 Id. at 14-24 (analysing the European countries). 
107 Id. at 17. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. 
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gives issuers the right to request disclosure of beneficial ownership and, 
under Article §524 of the Corporation Act, “all intermediaries representing 
investors at shareholder meetings must disclose their clients’ voting 
instructions, and number of shares voted, to the issuer.”110 
On balance, it appears that each of the jurisdictions discussed above 
has addressed the issue of transparency of beneficial ownership to some 
degree and that the EU Transparency Directive has contributed to an 
environment of greater disclosure of beneficial ownership. At the same time, 
according to the above-mentioned studies, there are some remaining issues 
and areas worth further research and reform since member nations do not 
have a fully harmonised procedure regarding transparency of beneficial 
ownership.111 These will be discussed in a consolidated manner in Part VI of 
this article.112 
III. U.S. INITIATIVES ON BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP 
TRANSPARENCY 
In the United States, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the 
Securities Exchange Act) is the primary legislation that governs the 
disclosure and reporting of beneficial ownership and control structures for 
listed companies. In addition, the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act of 
2010 became effective as of 2014, and deals with foreign accounts in 
financial institutions with the goal of discovering the identities of anonymous 
beneficiaries of corporate vehicles. Finally and most recently, the United 
States seeks to fulfill the pledge of the 2013 G8 Summit’s action plan on 
beneficial ownership disclosure by passing the currently debated 
Incorporation Transparency and Law Enforcement Assistance Act (the 
“Levin Bill” or “ITLEAA”). 
A. Securities Exchange Act of 1934113 
Under Section 13(d) and 13(g) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 
1934, the initial threshold for reporting is set at 5% ownership in a listed 
company, consistent with the EU Transparency Directive and international 
                                                
110 Id. at 22. 
111 See generally Fleischer and Schmolke, supra note 75 (discussing whether full 
harmonization of the Transparency Directive is a necessary next step or even a viable 
option, weighing the pros and cons of such a move by the EU). 
112  See Part VI of this article (Outstanding Issues and Impact on Corporate 
Performance). 
113 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78(a) (2006); see also Securities and 
Exchange Commission, Beneficial Ownership Reporting Requirements and Security-
based Swaps (SEC Release No. 34-64628, June 8, 2011). 
141                               Chi.-Kent J. Int’l & Comp. L.                 Vol. XVI 
 
 
norms. A person who is the beneficial owner of more than 5% of equity 
securities must disclose information related to such beneficial ownership 
within ten days of reaching the threshold.114 Rule 13d-3(a) defines beneficial 
owners as “persons who may, directly or indirectly, vote or dispose or direct 
the voting or disposition of a voting class of equity securities under section 
12.” 115  Furthermore, Section 13(d) and Schedule 13D require that the 
beneficial owner disclose extensive personal and professional information in 
regards to the purchased equity securities.116 Section 13(d)(2) and Rule 13d-
2(a) impose a further obligation on the beneficial owner to report any 
material changes through a Schedule 13D amended filing. Under Rule 13d-
2(a), a material change is deemed to be “the acquisition or disposition of 
beneficial ownership of securities in an amount equal to 1% or more of a 
class of securities,”117 though the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) 
reserves the right to consider lesser acquisitions and dispositions as material 
based on facts and circumstances.118  
One of the unique and important features of the Securities Exchange 
Act is that Rule 13d-3 allows for a case-by-case determination of whether a 
person is deemed to be a beneficial owner.119 This allows proportionality, 
flexibility and a “market practice”120 approach in handling and integrating 
new financial arrangements under the existing law that may run afoul of the 
Securities Exchange Act, such as cash settled equity directives and security-
based swaps.121 In addition, the SEC’s Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis 
and Retrieval System (EDGAR), stores, reports and analyses data regarding 
beneficial ownership and control information filed with the SEC.122 On most 
counts, EDGAR is publicly available. 
 
                                                
114 Vermeulen, supra note 30, at 21. 




119 Id. at 21 (citing Securities and Exchange Commission, Beneficial Ownership 
Reporting Requirements and Security-based Swaps (SEC Release N0. 34-64628, 
June 8, 2011)). 
120 Id. at 21, 26. 
121 Id. at 22 (discussing section 766 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2010, which amended the Securities Exchange Act to add section 
13(o) to deal with security-based swaps). 
122 Id. 
142                               Chi.-Kent J. Int’l & Comp. L.                 Vol. XVI 
 
 
B. Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act of 2010123 
In addition to the Securities Exchange Act, the Foreign Account Tax 
Compliance Act of 2010 (FATCA), which came into effect in 2014, aims at 
discovering the identities of anonymous beneficiaries of corporate vehicles 
by targeting financial institutions and foreign accounts.124 FATCA imposes 
an obligation on foreign U.S. persons and foreign entities to report any and 
all substantial U.S. ownership,125  through shell companies and corporate 
vehicles, for instance, 126 to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and to foreign 
financial services. According to Greenberg, “the rules are intended to provide 
reporting both on accounts held directly by individuals and on interests in 
accounts held by shell entities for the benefit of U.S. persons.”127 In addition, 
FATCA intends to “weed out” U.S. persons who may be hiding as 
anonymous beneficiaries of corporate vehicles.128 Failure to comply with the 
reporting requirements of FATCA subject any non-complying institutions 
and beneficial owners to an almost 30% withholding tax.129  
C. Incorporation Transparency and Law Enforcement 
Assistance Act of 2013130 
A final noteworthy U.S. initiative towards mandating beneficial 
ownership disclosure is the Incorporation Transparency and Law 
Enforcement Assistance Act of 2013 (the “Levin Bill” or “ITLEAA”). The 
purpose of ITLEAA is “to ensure that owners and formation agents who for 
non-publicly held companies in the United States disclose the beneficial 
owners of those companies.”131 The reason for such mandatory disclosure is 
to prevent criminally minded individuals from creating and using corporate 
vehicles in the United States for illicit purposes, such as money laundering, 
                                                
See Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE (Dec. 19, 
2014), http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Corporations/Foreign-Account-Tax-
Compliance-Act-FATCA.  
124 See id.  
125 Biedermann, supra note 5, at 82 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 1473(2)(A) (2010), where 
“substantial United States Owner” means ownership of “more than 10 percent of the 
stock” in a corporation, rights to “more than 10 percent of the profits interests or 
capital interests” of a partnership, or indirectly or directly holding “10 percent 
beneficial interest” in a trust). 
126 Id., at 81. 
127 Itai Greenberg, The Battle over Taxing Offshore Accounts, 60 UCLA L. REV. 304, 
334 (2012).  
128 Biedermann, supra note 5, at 83. 
129 Id., at 82 (discussing relevant provisions of FATCA). 
130 S. 569, 111th Cong. §2(3) (2009) (as introduced by Sen. Carl Levin, Mar. 11, 
2009). 
131 Kalant, supra note 3, at 1054. 
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tax evasion, and other illicit uses with shell companies.132 ITLEAA would 
impose an obligation on all U.S. states to maintain an accurate and updated 
list of all beneficial owners of corporations and LLCs created in the state, and 
to provide that list to law enforcement and others by subpoena or written 
request.133  
Three key features of ITLEAA are noteworthy and have led to 
controversial debates about whether it would effectively address the issues 
surrounding lack of transparency of beneficial ownership. First, ITLEAA 
would place a heavy burden on states and formation agents to collect and 
maintain an up-to-date list of all beneficial owners.134 In addition, states must 
also provide an annual report that updates the state’s list of beneficial 
owners.135 Second, as part of maintaining such list, ITLEAA requires the state 
to “maintain a copy of driver’s licenses of all such beneficial owners.”136 For 
foreign-held corporations in the U.S., ITLEAA requires that a formation 
agent certify the foreign application for incorporation in a U.S. state before 
the state will formally and legally accept the company.137 As part of the 
certification process, beneficial owners of a foreign-held corporation or LLC 
must provide “a photocopy of the page of the government-issued passport on 
which a photograph of the beneficial owner appears.”138 
ITLEAA imposes, arguably, onerous civil and criminal penalties 
on individuals and entities for failure to comply with the reporting 
requirements. For example, failure to provide correct beneficial ownership 
information or knowingly falsifying such information can result in a 
maximum fine of USD $10,000 and up to three years in prison.139 
D. External Studies of U.S. Beneficial Ownership 
Transparency 
The reports from external studies mainly center on an evaluation of 
current law and practices, namely the Securities Exchange Act. According to 
Vermeulen’s comparative study of beneficial ownership disclosure across 
five jurisdictions, the United States “has clear, accessible, and also flexible 
                                                
132 Id. at 1053-1054. 
133 Verret, supra note 51, at 859; S. 569, 111th Cong. §3(a)(1)(a)(1)(D) (2009).  
134 See Id., at 859 (listing several burdens on states and formation agents); see also 
Kalant, supra note 3, at 1056 (stating “how and to whom the ownership information 
would be provided”).  
135 Verret, supra note 51, at 859. 
136 Id. 
137 Kalant, supra note 3, at 1056-1057. 
138  Id., at 1057; see also S. 569, 111th Cong. §3(a)(1)(a)(2)(B) (2009). 
139 Verret, supra note 51, at 859; S. 569, 111th Cong. §3(a)(1)(b) (2009). 
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rules that provide transparency in different layers of shareholding.”140 It 
includes  web-based access to EDGAR that “provides detailed and up-to-date 
information about listed companies, making it possible for companies to 
build a reputation as a competent and reliable investment opportunity.”141 
 Somewhat contrary to Vermeulen’s assessment, Computershare’s 
2015 market analysis of transparency of share ownership (beneficial 
ownership) based on international standards rated the United States as 
providing “low transparency of share ownership for issuers due to the 
depository structure.”142 The U.S. central securities depository (CSD), the 
Depository Trust Company (DTC), places legal ownership in the name of its 
nominee, Cede & Co., which means that DTC-eligible U.S. securities “are 
registered to Cede & Co, significantly reducing the direct visibility of 
investors on the share register.”143 Issuers can request the DTC to provide a 
list of beneficial owners under the law, but investors who hold securities 
through intermediaries may refuse to have their identity disclosed.144 This is 
the case for institutional investors who are more commonly objecting 
beneficial owners (OBOs).145 Furthermore, stock exchange-mandated fees for 
disclosure make the process of seeking beneficial ownership transparency 
cost-prohibitive. 
Given that the FATCA was only recently implemented and it is not 
certain whether the ITLEAA will pass congressional approval, it is too early 
to assess the impact of both of these initiatives on company ownership 
disclosure. In addition, both FATCA and ITLEAA have garnered their share 
of criticism, which will be discussed in a consolidated manner in Part VI of 
this article.146 
IV. INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS AT MANDATING 
OWNERSHIP DISCLOSURE 
Apart from the EU and U.S. initiatives in mandating disclosure of 
beneficial ownership, this section analyzes other international efforts aimed at 
creating greater transparency of beneficial ownership. While the issue of tax 
                                                
140 Vermeulen, supra note 30, at 29 (praising the flexibility and proportionality 
approach in the U.S. that allows for greater adaptability to technological evolution 
and further financial innovation with respect to tracking beneficial owners). 
141 Id. 




146  See Part VI of this article (Outstanding Issues and Impact on Corporate 
Performance).  
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havens is not extensively discussed in this article, it is important to keep in 
mind that, according to several reports and studies, the largest culprits of 
avoiding disclosure of beneficial ownership requirements are off-shore tax 
havens such as the British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Cook Islands and 
Singapore.147 
A. OECD Model Tax Convention 
Despite criticisms to the contrary, 148  the OECD Model Tax 
Convention on Income and Capital (OECD Model Tax Convention) is 
regarded as providing “the prevailing international norms for a valid 
information request” between countries with respect to proliferating company 
information in foreign jurisdictions.149   
Article 26 of the OECD Model Tax Convention allows authorities to 
pursue claims against anonymous beneficiaries by placing a request for 
exchange of information with another treaty member state. The information 
request is valid so long as it is “foreseeably relevant” to the state’s domestic 
tax laws.150 However, Article 26 also provides for several exceptions through 
which a treaty member state can refuse to comply with the request for 
exchange of information, including requests that: (a) would require the state 
to take actions or administrative measures that are contrary to state practice; 
(b) supply information that would not ordinarily be supplied under the laws 
of that state; and (c) disclose information that would contravene the state’s 
public policy.151 Because the language of these exceptions is so broad and all 
encompassing, it is difficult to understand how the OECD Model Tax 
Convention can serve as an effective, enforcement-based procedure for 
regulating the capture, analysis, reporting, and public transparency of 
beneficial ownership disclosure.152 
                                                
147 Biedermann, supra note 5, at 87 (citing the Int’l Consortium of Investigative 
Journalists (ICIJ), Offshore Leaks Database (2013), available at http:// 
offshoreleaks.icij.org/search);  see also Global Witness Report, supra note 8, at 7-8 
(listing tax havens where public registries of beneficial ownership do not exist). 
148  See Lee Sheppard, Don't Sign OECD Model Tax Treaties!, TAX JUSTICE 
NETWORK (May 31, 2013), http://taxjustice.blogspot.com/2013/05/lee-sheppard-
dont-sign-oecd-model-tax.html.  
149 Biedermann, supra note 5, at 88 
150 Id., at 78 (citing to OECD, Update to Article 26 of the OECD Model Tax 
Convention and its Commentary, 1 (2012),http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-
information/120718_Article%2026-ENG_no%20cover%20(2).pdf); see also OLIVER 
R. HOOR, THE OECD TAX CONVENTION: A COMPREHENSIVE TECHNICAL ANALYSIS 
233 (Legitech, 2010).  
151 Biedermann, supra note 5, at 88.  
152Id. at 79 (discussing other provisions of the OECD Model Tax Convention and its 
potential limitations). 
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The leaders at the 2013 G8 Summit did support a revision to the 
OECD Model Tax Convention to require “an automatic exchange of 
information”153 to obtain information more quickly and effectively on the 
beneficial ownership of “shell companies, special purpose companies, and 
trust arrangements.”154 However, only eight nations are obligated to abide by 
the G8 Principles. While these nations do have strong influential reputations, 
the Convention has yet to be revised, and even if revised,  it would have to be 
ratified and implemented by a significant portion of the signing member 
states. It is unlikely that member states would support an automatic exchange 
of information as this may tread on issues of state sovereignty and more 
importantly, because it would reduce the enormous benefits and competitive 
advantages that some jurisdictions likely enjoy from not disclosing beneficial 
ownership and control structures to the public.  
B. Transparency of Beneficial Ownership in Asian Countries 
Computershare’s March 2015 report on the results of a market 
analysis of transparency of share ownership to issuers focused, in part, on 
Asian countries including Australia, China, Hong Kong, India, and Japan.155 
In addition, Vermeulen’s 2012 comparative analysis of five jurisdictions and 
their beneficial disclosure regimes included China, Indonesia, and 
Malaysia.156 Moreover, Global Witness’ 2013 report on hidden company 
ownership briefly reviewed that state of public transparency into hidden 
company ownership in Hong Kong and Singapore.157 
By international standards, Australia is viewed as having a high level 
of transparency of shareholder information for issuers.158 This is because 
Australia’s CSD, CHESS, is structured based on direct legal title. In addition, 
laws in Australia give legal rights to listed companies (issuers) to obtain 
information on their beneficial owners.159 A share register, consisting of two 
sub-registers, is updated and provided to the issuer at the end of each day. 
The complete share register is available for public inspection. With respect to 
                                                
153 2013 Lough Erne G8 Leaders' Communiqué, GOV.UK 6-7 (June 18, 2013),  
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/20777
1/Lough_Erne_2013_G8_Leaders_Communique.pdf.   
154 Biedermann, supra note 5, at 88.  
155 See Corney et al., supra note 56. 
156 Vermeulen, supra note 30, at 25-27 (discussing disclosure of beneficial ownership 
with respect to control structures, control-enhancing mechanisms and arrangements 
and corporate vehicles). 
157 Global Witness Report, supra note 8, at 5-6. 
158 Corney et al., supra note 56, at 4. 
159 Id.  
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nominee accounts with an intermediary, issuers can demand that the nominee 
disclose beneficial owners under Section 672 of the Corporations Act of 
2001.160 
While China is still considered to be a primarily domestic market 
with “government entities holding a controlling interest in many public 
companies,” 161  by international standards, Computershare’s study grades 
China as “a highly transparent market of share ownership for issuers.”162 This 
is because all shares are registered in a state-controlled central registrar where 
issuers are able to receive a list of all shareholders “on a monthly basis free of 
charge.”163 According to the Law of the People’s Republic of China on 
Securities (China Securities Law), a listed company must disclose detailed 
information about beneficial ownership (those holding 5% or more) and 
voting rights both in semi-annual and annual reports.164 Under Article 3 of the 
Administrative Measures on Information Disclosure by Listed Companies, 
there is an affirmative obligation on company directors to ensure the accuracy 
and completeness of any information disclosed, which is further reinforced 
by the duty of company directors to sign and certify regular reports under 
Article 24. 165  Moreover, listed companies must report information of 
beneficial ownership and control structure to their respective stock exchanges 
as well as to the China Securities Regulatory Commission.166 Thus, China 
requires a great deal of disclosure from companies, which seems appropriate 
given how many companies are state-controlled. 
Similar to China, India is considered to be a predominantly domestic 
market. 167  By international standards, India is a “particularly high 
transparency market of share ownership for issuers.”168 Share ownership can 
be in the form of registered and certified shares listed on a share register, or 
held in a dematerialized form by an intermediary in two central depository 
                                                
160 Id. 
161 Id. at 6.  
162 Id. (discussing the differences in B-shares and Qualified Foreign Institutional 
Investor (QFII) scheme specifically for foreign investment in China). 
163 Id. (noting that, with respect to QFII foreign shareholders, the registered owner is 
more often a financial intermediary so the issuer “has no mechanism to obtain the 
beneficial ownership beyond this level”). 
164 Vermeulen, supra note 30, at 25. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. at 26. 
167 Corney et al., supra note 56, at 10. 
168 Id. (noting also that India, similar to China, has implemented the Qualified 
Foreign Institutional Investor (QFII) program specifically for foreign investors in 
India). 
148                               Chi.-Kent J. Int’l & Comp. L.                 Vol. XVI 
 
 
services.169 Indian law gives beneficial owners the legal rights in the shares 
purchased, without the need for intermediaries to have legal rights.170 This 
allows for “direct visibility and a direct legal relationship between the issuers 
and their beneficial owners…”171 Furthermore, under the Companies Bill of 
2012, a full list of beneficial owners is filed with the stock exchange, after 
each annual general meeting, and with the Registrar of Companies.172 Anyone 
can access the list of beneficial owners upon reasonable notice and payment 
of a nominal fee.173 
However, since India has adopted the Qualified Foreign Institutional 
Investor programme (QFII), there is less visibility into foreign beneficial 
ownership.174 Both India and China would do well to reconsider the need for 
a QFII regime as their markets develop, especially if they wish to reach their 
full potential. In the alternative, changes to the QFII regime to allow for 
greater access and visibility into foreign beneficial ownership may be 
warranted, as seems to be the case concerning the legislative intent 
underlying U.S. ITLEAA, discussed in Part IV(c) of this article. 
Japan is considered as providing “moderate to low transparency of 
share ownership” to issuers.175  First, while investors can directly register 
their shares with the issuer’s share register, this is not common practice.176 
Most investors are institutional investors who use nominee accounts, such as 
custodial or omnibus accounts, through intermediaries.177 Only the nominee 
or omnibus account information (i.e., intermediary account) is listed on the 
issuer’s share register as the legal shareholder, thus precluding disclosure of 
beneficial ownership. 178  While issuers do receive information about all 
nominee accounts from Japan’s Security Depository Center (SDC) twice per 
year and the account details may disclose the underlying beneficial owner, 
this practice is not consistent, 179  and high fees preclude more frequent 
updates and reporting requests.180 Second, similar to China and India but 
without having a formal QFII program, securities for foreign investors in 
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Japan are held and “recorded through a foreign intermediary, who holds legal 
title to the shares,”181 thus reducing visibility to foreign beneficial owners. 
Japan’s beneficial ownership disclosure regime could certainly benefit from 
some reforms. 
Similar to India, Hong Kong is a “highly transparent market of share 
ownership for issuers,”182 primarily because Hong Kong law supports an 
issuer’s right to disclosure of beneficial ownership in listed companies.183 
Investors can hold shares directly through a certified form for registered 
shares or via an intermediary in Hong Kong’s CCASS, a transparent 
depository that permits public disclosure on Hong Kong’s stock exchange. 
With respect to issuers’ right of disclosure, under Section 329 of the 
Securities and Futures Ordinance (Cap 571), issuers can compel the 
intermediary to disclose the underlying beneficial owners, even those who are 
represented in a chain of beneficial owners.184 In a further step towards 
transparency, issuers also notify the stock exchange and the Securities and 
Futures Commission of any disclosure requests,185 the findings of which are 
publicly available on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange website. 
Finally, Vermeulen’s study reveals Malaysia as “offering a high level 
of disclosure and reporting”186 with a beneficial ownership disclosure regime 
that is “very extended and detailed”187 and includes “easy electronic access to 
ownership and control information.”188 Minority investors and the public can 
find information about shareholders “as far as the final layer of beneficial 
owners,”189 as long as the shareholder is a “substantial shareholder,” meaning 
that the shareholder “holds, either directly or indirectly, at least 5% of the 
outstanding shares.”190 
Under the Malaysian Companies Act (amended in 2006), companies 
have several obligations with respect to disclosure of beneficial ownership. 
                                                
181 Id. 
182 Id. at 8; Cf. Global Witness Report, supra note 8, at 6 (stating that Hong Kong 
does not have a register [public or private] of beneficial ownership). 
183 Corney et, al,, supra note 56, at 8. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. (citing to Section 330 of the Securities and Futures Ordinance and noting that 
disclosure of beneficial owners is more difficult for those beyond Hong Kong’s 
jurisdiction due to lax enforcement and penalties for non-compliance on disclosure 
requests). 




190 Id. (citing Section 69D of the Malaysian Companies Act (last amended in 2006). 
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Under Section 158, companies must keep and maintain a detailed register of 
their members and the number of shares they hold, which is public and is 
“open to inspection by any member free of charge.”191 In addition to the 
general shareholder register, Section 69C requires companies to maintain a 
separate register containing only the substantial shareholders, including any 
changes in shareholding position as well as a detailed explanation of the 
change.192 Moreover, a similar obligation rests with the shareholder, who has 
a duty to notify the company when, if ever, he or she became a substantial 
shareholder.193 
Under the Listing Requirements of Bursa Malaysia Securities Berhad 
(Listing Requirements), a listed company must: (i) announce notices related 
to substantial shareholdings;194 (ii) announce any changes of control in the 
company;195 and (iii) identify substantial shareholders in its annual report196 
along with other details regarding the substantial shareholders and direct 
interests. These company announcements are submitted to and available 
through Bursa Malaysia Listing Information Network (Bursa LINK), which 
enables providers, investors and regulators “to instantly obtain information 
about beneficial ownership and control structures.”197 
 A third and important aspect of Malaysia’s beneficial ownership 
disclosure regime is the Securities Industry Central Depositories Act 1991 
(SICDA). Under SICDA, every securities account must be opened “in the 
name of the beneficial owner… or in the name of the authorized nominee.”198 
Where the account is opened in the name of the authorized nominee, SICDA 
Rule 25.02B(2) requires that the authorized nominee (intermediary) stipulate 
the identity of the beneficial owner and relevant details about the beneficial 
owner. Further information can also be requested by numerous regulatory 
agencies. The authorized nominee can face revocation to act as nominee 
account holder as well as suspension from all managed accounts for failure to 
comply with the disclosure requirements. Furthermore, the nominee 
companies and custodians who operate omnibus accounts are also required to 
                                                
191 Id. (citing to Section 160(2) of the Malaysian Companies Act). 
192 Id. at 24 (discussing Section 69L of the Malaysian Companies Act). 
193 Id. (citing to Section 69E of the Malaysian Companies Act). 
194 Id. (citing Paragraph 9.19(17) and (18) of Malaysia’s Listing Requirements). 
195 Id. (citing Paragraph 9.19(41) of Malaysia’s Listing Requirements). 
196 Id. (citing Paragraph 23, Appendix 9C of Malaysia’s Listing Requirements). 
197 Vermeulen, supra note 30, at 25. 
198 Id. (citing Section 25(4) of the Securities Industry (Central Depositories Act) 1991 
(SICDA)). 
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disclose beneficial owners199 upon request by the Securities Commission of 
Malaysia, subject to criteria under Section 45 where disclosure is permitted 
without violating the beneficial owner’s consent.200 
As compared with many jurisdictions, Malaysia does, indeed, appear 
to have one of the most comprehensive and detailed beneficial ownership 
disclosure schemes. Some might even say that this scheme is too complex 
and burdensome on the listed company and beneficial owners. This leads to a 
larger question of how strict or how flexible should a beneficial ownership 
disclosure regime be. While this is not the direct focus of this article, in the 
case of Malaysia, Vermeulen points out that before the 1997-1998 Asian 
financial crisis, Malaysia had very simple and basic rules on beneficial 
ownership.201 In response to the Asian financial crisis, Malaysia went to the 
opposite extreme and enacted detailed, extensive and rather strict laws, which 
may have restored investor confidence for a short time but also “negatively 
affected Malaysia’s reputation and attractiveness… to foreign investors.”202 
This led to Malaysia’s initiative to implement reforms in 2005 to “relax and 
streamline the regime.”203 Whether those efforts are successful remains to be 
seen. One could argue that Malaysia’s current regime faces some of the same 
issues as other jurisdictions, where there is no public register of beneficial 
ownership combined with a cost-heavy and resource-intensive compliance 
and enforcement system.204 
V. OUTSTANDING ISSUES, POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS, 
AND IMPACT ON CORPORATE PERFORMANCE 
 
A. Outstanding Issues and Policy Recommendations 
From the above analysis, there is some room for relief and 
celebration in knowing that jurisdictions are concerned with the impacts of 
hidden company ownership, and serious about implementing measures to 
increase transparency of the disclosure and findings of company beneficial 
ownership. However, as we look back on the commitments at the 2013 G8 
Summit, the issue has not yet reached effective resolution.  In the wake of 
ever-increasing innovation in the financial sector coupled with the 
                                                
199 Id. 
200 Id. 
201 Id. at 26. 
202 Id. 
203 Id. 
204 Id. at 46 (discussing Malaysia’s public enforcement system as compared with an 
informal public or private enforcement systems). 
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imaginative creation corporate vehicles for personal as well as sometimes 
illicit gain, outstanding issues remain. 
1. Defining Ownership 
The first and most foundational issue is defining terms such as 
‘ownership,’  ‘beneficial ownership,’ ‘control’ and ‘transparency,’ as they 
relate to issues of implementing an effective disclosure and transparency 
regime for hidden company ownership. As discussed in the preliminary 
sections of this article, there are myriad definitions of ownership, but it is 
most commonly referred to as beneficial ownership. However, there are 
multiple definitions of beneficial ownership, such as the potentially 
contradictory definitions in the U.S. Securities Exchange Act, which focuses 
on ‘voting power’ and ‘investment power,’ as compared to U.S. proposed 
ITLEAA, which focuses on the degree of ‘control’ of a shareholder.205 
Another example is the EU Transparency Directive’s use of ‘power to 
exercise dominant influence or control’ versus Malaysia’s use of ‘substantial 
shareholder.’ Moreover, while the majority of jurisdictions have adopted the 
international norm of 5% initial threshold as the mark of “beneficial 
ownership,” Russia uses “more than 1% of shares in a company” as the 
delimiter on whether a shareholder is important enough to review the share 
register or vote. Perhaps it is time to establish a more consistent, cross-border 
definition for the problem that mandatory company ownership disclosure is 
intended to solve, based on the goals to be obtained by mandating such 
information.  
Vermeulen argues that a disclosure and enforcement regime could be 
devised to target different types of beneficial owners, such as: “(1) passive 
beneficial owners who are only interested in a company’s share price, (2) 
beneficial owners who monitor the performance of listed companies and 
initiate dialogues with management, and (3) beneficial owners that seek to 
acquire control over a listed company.”206 If such distinctions do exist, and 
shareholders do have different functions and rationales for acquiring equity 
securities, it makes sense to adopt a clear, comprehensive, yet concise 
                                                
205 Verret, supra note 51, at 863 (discussing a major criticism of the Levin Bill in 
mixing concepts of ownership and control: “One would be a focus on owners, the 
other a focus merely on those individuals or owners who actually control the 
company. The latter offers a clearer view of those who might be using the entity for 
illegal purposes, and yet, defining control…is a particularly difficult task”). 
206 Vermeulen, supra note 30, at 17. 
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definition of ownership to accommodate these functions, and to harmonise 
these terms and definitions across jurisdictions.  
In addition, by reviewing the statutory interpretation of nearly all 
definitions of “beneficial ownership,” one of the main concerns is to manage 
those who would be considered inside blockholders with the intention to 
control the company. Delineating the definition of beneficial ownership down 
to purposeful definitions would certainly reduce the costs of gathering and 
verifying information, enhance the ability for generating useful reports on 
company ownership, increase the likelihood that law enforcement and 
regulatory agencies can intervene where illicit activity occurs, and more 
importantly, provide transparency of communication and decision-making. 
2. Defining Transparency 
A second outstanding yet foundational issue is the need for greater 
clarity and consensus on the definition of transparency, especially with 
respect to the level of transparency necessary to have an effective beneficial 
ownership disclosure and enforcement regime.  
Disclosure and transparency, as used in this article, can have different 
meanings. At the national level, companies and regulatory agencies may 
compel disclosure of beneficial ownership information; however, whether 
such information is transparent to the degree necessary to prevent the issue of 
hidden company ownership is a different matter. As analysed in Part II(C) of 
this article, transparency, to date consists of at least three different 
components: (i) transparency to the issuer through required disclosures under 
national law by investors who reach certain ownership thresholds; (ii) 
transparency to the issuer through disclosures under national law by 
intermediaries who hold securities for investors and who must respond to 
formal disclosure requests; and (iii) transparency to the general public, 
international regulatory agencies and law enforcement about beneficial 
owners in companies.207  
Moreover, because companies today operate in a global economy, the 
degree of transparency required by bodies of international trade, such as the 
World Trade Organization (WTO), must be taken into account. The WTO’s 
glossary defines transparency as “the degree to which trade policies and 
practices, and the process by which they are established, are open and 
                                                
207 See Part II(c) of this article. 
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predictable.”208 In effect, according to Martinez-Fraga, a general principle of 
transparency in international law “suggest[s], if not altogether commands… a 
universal absence of concealment.”209  
By applying the above definitions to beneficial ownership disclosure 
policies and practices, as well as the process by which they are determined, it 
is clear that the international community has a long way to go with respect to 
meeting the high standards of transparency indicated above, especially in 
terms of predictability.210 At the same time, transparency will not create a 
climate of openness and predictability if there is asymmetrical information or 
policies and rules that nobody understands,211 especially those tasked with 
complying with such rules, analysing the data, or enforcing the laws that 
require disclosure of the information. Under this understanding of 
transparency, studies show that most countries have national legislation 
aimed at disclosure of beneficial ownership information by investors and 
intermediaries to the issuer. Such disclosures are subject to a formal request 
and sometimes at a high cost, and only by the issuer to the national regulatory 
and monitoring agencies. What is missing is a consistent and up-to-date 
national and international public registry of beneficial company ownership.  
The May 2014 G20 Position Paper highlights several advantages of a 
public registry of beneficial company ownership as a means to accomplish 
transparency goals, including but not limited to: (i) reducing the red-tape in 
law enforcement in conducting cross-border investigations so that there is 
less likelihood that money-launderers have advance warning to shift assets 
quickly; (ii) serving as a cost-effective way to enforce financial crimes 
legislation; (iii) allowing investors to know company ownership players in 
order to facilitate honest trade and make informed decisions on investments; 
and (iv) building greater trust among civil society in the battle to combat 
crime and corruption. 212  To accomplish this requires an international 
                                                
208 Avnita Lakhani, The Role of Transparency in the Harmonization of Commercial 
Law, 19.1 THE VINDOBONA J. OF INT’L COM. L. AND ARB. 93 (2015) (citing T. 
Collins-Williams and R. Wolfe, Transparency as a trade policy tool: the WTO's 
cloudy windows, 9(4) WORLD TRADE REV. 551 (2010)).   
209  Lakhani, supra note 211, at 93 (citing P. J. Martinez-Fraga, Juridical 
Convergence in International Law Dispute Resolution: Developing a Substantive 
Principle of Transparency and Transnational Evidence Gathering, 10 LOY. U. CHI. 
INT’L L. REV. 37, 66, 69-70 (2012).  
210 The issue of predictability was highlighted in Mazars’ assessment of the EU 
Transparency Directive. Demarigny and Clerc, supra note 85, at XVIII. 
211 Lakhani, supra note 211, at 94. 
212  G20 Position Paper: Transparency of Legal Entities and Arrangements, 
TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL 2 (May 2014), https://www.transparency.it/wp-
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consensus on the levels of company ownership based on function and 
intention, as well as a consensus on the exact threshold of beneficial 
ownership that should trigger legal and policy actions to prevent illicit use of 
corporate vehicles, trusts, control structures, and other arrangements. For 
example, it is possible that the norm of 5% initial threshold to trigger 
beneficial ownership reporting is too cumbersome, costly and ineffective for 
the purposes of monitoring a shareholder whose intention is to control the 
company,213 especially considering that only a 2% (as in Malaysia) or 1% (as 
in Russia) initial threshold is necessary to monitor corruption and money-
laundering. In short, a more nuanced, targeted approach would yield more 
effective outcomes.214 A nuanced and targeted regime would also reduce the 
fear of engaging in positive and legitimate shareholder activities aimed at 
monitoring management performance, facilitating genuine shareholder 
activism, reducing horizontal and vertical agency costs, and encouraging 
stability in share price and company valuation. 
3. Understanding the Impact of Corporate Vehicles  
A third outstanding issue is the need for more focused research, 
understanding, and regulation regarding the impact of trusts, nominee 
accounts, omnibus accounts, cash-settled derivatives, cash-settled swaps and 
control-enhancing mechanisms, and arrangements on hidden company 
ownership. As evidence by the aforementioned studies and analysis in 
previous sections, there are extensive use of trusts, nominee accounts, 
omnibus accounts and control-enhancing mechanisms in each jurisdiction.  
                                                                                                                
content/uploads/2014/05/TI-G20-Position-papers-Beneficial-Ownership.pdf; Cf. 
Verret, supra note 51, at 890-91 (discussing the legitimate business privacy needs for 
keeping control structures and beneficial ownership out of the public realm, 
something which the U.S. Levin Bill would allegedly jeopardise by increasing the 
costs to maintain business privacy, especially given the Freedom of Information Act 
and the right-to-know laws in nearly 40 states in the U.S.); see generally 76 C.J.S. 
Records § 113 (2009); 37A Am. Jur. 2d Freedom of Information Acts § 56 (2010); 
Backer, supra note 62, at 4 (discussing how transparency can increase “legitimacy 
(norm) and accountability (technique) among stakeholders”). 
213 See, e.g., Fleischer and Schmolke, supra note 96, at 126-28 (discussing how, 
despite the 5% threshold set in the EU Transparency Directive, EU member nations 
are not following this notification threshold and some are even imposing additional 
notification thresholds not included in the Directive, thus leading to lack of 
harmonization in applying the Transparency Directive). 
214 See, e.g.,, Vermeulen, supra note 30, at 16-17 (discussing the disadvantages of a 
strict disclosure regime). 
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A 2011 World Bank study found trusts to be the second largest 
vehicle behind corporations to be used for corruption.215 In addition, one of 
the biggest criticisms of the U.S. proposed ITLEAA legislation is that it fails 
to require disclosure and tracking of beneficial ownership information from 
trusts, foundations, non-profit organisations and other legal structures, which 
are used for illicit financial gain and for fostering financial crimes.216  
In the case of nominee accounts, a nominee shareholder creates “a 
company… for the purpose of holding shares and other securities on behalf of 
investors.”217 Shares and other securities are held in trust for the actual 
beneficial owner.218 For foreign investors, in most jurisdictions, shares and 
securities may only be held through a nominee account in a foreign 
intermediary because the foreign shareholder is now allowed to participate 
directly or register directly with the local jurisdiction’s central securities 
depositories. Thus, at the local level, only the nominee account holder’s name 
appears on the issuer’s share register, which would provide an opportunity to 
beneficial owners, though sometimes unintentionally in the case of foreign 
investors, to shield their identity and make it more difficult to control 
expropriation by controlling shareholders.219  
Similarly, there are serious issues with concealing identities of 
beneficial owners through omnibus accounts. An omnibus account is opened 
in the name of the account provider and serves “as an umbrella securities 
account covering a large number of individual accounts.”220 While omnibus 
accounts help in reducing transaction costs, issuers only show the primary 
account holder (intermediary) on the share register, thus reducing visibility of 
the breakdown of beneficial owners behind omnibus accounts.  
In addition, the use of derivatives and related techniques, such as 
cash-settled equity derivatives and cash-settled swaps, are yet another way to 
reduce, or avoid altogether, the disclosure of beneficial owners. Cash-settled 
derivatives are used “to obtain effective control of the underlying shares 
                                                
215 G20 Position Paper, supra note 215, at 2 (citing Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative, 
Puppet Masters: how the corrupt use legal structures to hide stolen assets and what 
to do about it, WORLD BANK (2011).   
216 Verret, supra note 51, at 873.  
217 Vermeulen, supra note 30, at 12; see Corney et al, supra note 56, at 35. 
218 Vermeulen, supra note 30, at 12. 
219 Note: As indicated in the above sections, most jurisdictions can compel disclosure 
of the beneficial owners under nominee and omnibus accounts by filing a formal 
request with the intermediary; however, there are fees for such requests, which may 
deter some issuers with large shareholders. 
220 Vermeulen, supra note 30, at 12; See Corney et. al., supra note 56, at 35. 
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without the need for disclosure…” 221  The cash-settled swap agreement 
essentially “results in a decoupling of the voting rights from the beneficial 
ownership of the shares…lead[ing] to ‘hidden ownership’ and ‘empty voting’ 
issues.” 222Hidden ownership allows an investor to maintain an undisclosed 
“long position in the shares of a listed company… until the investor 
physically acquires the shares”223 or settlement is finalised.  
While the UK and France have already taken steps to combat hidden 
ownership issues, and other EU member states such as Italy, the Netherlands 
and Portugal are discussing solutions, 224  there is no EU-wide or even 
international solution to the ramifications of “hidden ownership” at this stage. 
In empty voting scenarios, the voting “occurs when the shareholder on record 
date is no longer the economic owner when the vote closes”225 as in the case 
where there is a long period of time between a company’s annual meeting 
date when voting occurs and the record date. According to Hu and Black, 
“empty voters” are “persons whose voting rights substantially exceed their 
net economic ownership.”226 Despite this, the derivatives broker “votes the 
shares as directed by the investor.” According to Schouten and confirmed by 
a variety of scholars, empty voting can pose a serious threat or undermine the 
decision-making process in shareholder meetings.227 Empty voting issues 
may be combined with over-voting228 or negative voting to distort or mask 
the identity of beneficial owners as well as impair legitimate decision-making 
processes within a listed company. 
Finally, control-enhancing mechanisms such as shareholder 
agreements, pyramid ownership structures, and cross-holding ownership 
structures229 are designed to give controlling investors voting/control rights in 
excess of their cash-flow rights,230 in part by separating voting rights from 
                                                
221 Vermeulen, supra note 30, at 13. 
222 Id. 
223 Id.; see Schouten, supra note 12, at 160-70 (discussing the issues with hidden 
ownership). 
224 Fleischer and Schmolke, supra note 96, at 128. 
225 Corney et al, supra note 56, at 35; See Schouten, supra note 12, at 170-75 
(discussing the issues with empty voting). 
226 Schouten, supra note 12, at 170 (citing Hu and Black, supra note 13, at 825). 
227 Id. at 171-175 (discussing the issues with empty voting); See also Jonathan 
Cohen, Negative Voting: Why It Destroys Shareholder Value and a Proposal to 
Prevent It, 45 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 237, 237-49 (2008); Shaun Martin & Frank 
Partnoy, Encumbered Shares, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 775, 775 (2005). 
228 Corney et al, supra note 56, at 35. 
229 Vermeulen, supra note 30, at 13-14. 
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cash-flow rights.231 Pyramid structures are used extensively in Europe and, 
until recently, in Asian countries, though there is a declining trend in Asia 
because of legislation’s efforts in preventing such use.232 Such structures are 
used “to allow shareholders to retain substantial voting power”233  while 
reducing liquidity constraints. Control-enhancing mechanisms not only 
reduce visibility of beneficial ownership but, according to empirical studies, 
such mechanisms impose a negative impact on firm value.234 A heightened 
sense of policy imperatives needs to be aimed at understanding and 
improving the transparency of beneficial ownership in these various 
arrangements. 
4. Use of Technology 
The final outstanding issue, resolution to which can make a big 
impact on achieving the goals of public transparency of beneficial ownership, 
is making greater and more strategic use of technological innovations to 
automate the process of receiving, verifying, analyzing, and reporting 
beneficial ownership information.235  
As evidenced by the analysis of the jurisdictions in the 
aforementioned studies, each jurisdiction has their own technology platform 
and procedures for recording beneficial ownership information, even 
including websites to share that information as part of a national and private 
register. However, the studies point to unreasonable inefficiencies in the 
processes for capturing, verifying and reporting on this data. There are also 
unnecessary complexities in the overall beneficial disclosure and enforcement 
                                                
231 Id.; see Schouten, supra note 12, at 138-39; Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., Stock 
Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and Dual Class Equity: The Mechanisms and Agency 
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232 Vermeulen, supra note 30, at 13-14, 34-36 (discussing the use of pyramid 
ownership structures in Europe generally, Italy, China, Indonesia and other Asian 
countries as well as its decline in some nations because of legislation banning it). 
233 Id. at 13; see also Verret, supra note 51, at 869-70 (discussing stock pyramids and 
cross holdings, two types of ownership that would “significantly complicate the 
beneficial ownership reporting approach” under ITLEAA in particular). 
234 P. Limpaphayom, The Effect of Ownership Structure on the Relation between 
Corporate Governance and Firm Value in Thailand (paper presented at the OECD-
Indonesia Policy Dialogue: Disclosure of Beneficial Ownership and Control, Bali, 5 
October 2011). 
235 See, e.g., Demarigny and Clerc, supra note 85, at XVI (stating with reference to 
the EU Transparency Directive, “Two years after the introduction of the Directive, 
there would still not appear to be a stable and consensual vision on the manner in 
which stored information may be accessed at national and EU level [sic]”). 
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regime by the continuing use of manual forms,236 including the issuer’s 
considerable expenses in requests for disclosure of beneficial owners, , 
irregular updating of information, lack of sufficient technology infrastructure 
for consistent reporting, and having to submit multiple disclosure requests for 
chain of corporate vehicles hiding beneficial owners.  
Today, technological innovations such as cloud-based systems, 
mobile technology, and security-enabled encryption services can be used to 
automate the process of receiving, verifying, updating, analyzing and 
reporting beneficial ownership data on an international scale. Both in theory 
and in practice, a “one-stop-shop for disclosure of beneficial ownership 
information” is possible. This can serve as the foundation of a global public 
register, which creates trust among the investment community and ensures 
that those who seek to engage in illicit activity through hidden company 
ownership have a strong deterrent to doing so. 
B. Impact on Corporate Performance 
With respect to whether mandatory disclosure of beneficial company 
ownership, which is made publicly transparent, has an impact on corporate 
performance, Mazars’s assessment on the EU Transparency Directive seems 
to answer this in the negative. According to Mazar’s analysis, 69% of 
shareholders “do not consider the compliance cost with periodic information 
obligations to be too onerous.”237 Issuers subject to the EU Transparency 
Directive’s ownership disclosure obligations also tend to “publish more than 
the minimum requirements regarding half-yearly and quarterly financial 
information.”238 Perhaps this explains why 82% of respondents felt that the 
published information was useful in making investment decisions and 70% of 
stakeholders had positive comments about the quality of the published 
information, stating that it was “pertinent to making an informed assessment 
as to the financial position of the issuer.” 239  Furthermore, 58% of 
stakeholders stated that the notification of major holdings requirement under 
                                                
236 See id. at XVIII (stating that “66% of non-EU stakeholders would favour a 
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the Directive “do not result in an unreasonable increase of burden on the 
company.”240  
At the same time, there was a consensus that the timing of disclosure 
requirements should take into account the needs of SMEs and impact on its 
company performance in meeting the ownership disclosure obligations.241 In 
addition, while the periodic reporting requirements enhance accountability 
and provide certain confidence to investors, there is no regime to ascertain 
whether false or misleading information has been disclosed. 242  If this 
important verification process were triangulated like information in a 
scientific field, it would better serve the legislative intent and purpose of the 
EU Transparency Directive.  
Fleisher and Schmolke also highlight that the regime on disclosure of 
major shareholdings is severely impacted by the high level of fragmentation 
across the twenty-seven member states of the EU in adopting and 
implementing the Transparency Directive, leading to “significant costs on the 
investor.”243 For a listed company that is an institutional investor, it would 
certainly impact corporate performance to the extent that these costs cut into 
other important development priorities and income streams. As a listed 
company (both EU and non-EU), having to follow different notification 
thresholds across twenty-seven jurisdictions (not to mention the different 
methods of notification and levels of information) will certainly increase 
compliance costs for the company.244 This fragmentation may ultimately 
“give rise to a tangible threat of significant distortions of competition in the 
market for corporate influence and control.” 245  Under the minimum 
ownership disclosure requirements and thresholds of the Transparency 
Directive, EU member states can impose requirements that are more stringent 
and create an environment of regulatory competition among EU member 
states.246 This is neither effective nor efficient in terms of overall competition 
between EU companies and non-EU entities. 
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While the EU Transparency Directive generally receives positive 
responses from stakeholders, the US ITLEAA bill will negatively affect 
company performance and potentially trample on business privacy. The 
largest negative impact is compliance cost. For example, existing businesses, 
especially small businesses, will incur significant costs in meeting the 
ownership disclosure requirements because they will need to procure 
resources to keep up-to-date records and make additional provisions to ensure 
access to this data by law enforcement and regulatory agencies.247 New 
companies, both domestic and foreign, will suffer the same costs. In addition, 
state governments will incur non-subsidized costs for “hardware, software, 
and personnel required to collect, preserve, and make publicly available”248 
the beneficial ownership information for thousands of business entities across 
the state.  
The second negative impact, perhaps more important, is the Levin 
Bill’s potential to “change the competitive position of publicly held 
companies versus privately held companies.”249  Foreign governments, or 
even foreign companies in foreign nations, may request such information and 
use that information to “enhance their competitive position against U.S. 
companies”250 or use that information in furtherance of illicit activities, to 
avoid law enforcement, or to exploit such information for unlawful gain or 
competitive advantage.  
Finally, as discussed previously, disclosure of beneficial ownership 
information may negatively affect the decision-making processes of a 
company. Controlling shareholders as well as minority shareholders are not 
able to objectively assess management performance and guide the company 
towards achieving shareholder value without recriminations.  
Overall, despite potential concerns about the impact of beneficial 
ownership disclosure on corporate performance, a disclosure regime shall still 
                                                
247 See Verret, supra note 51, at 876 (citing HM Treasury & Dep't of Trade and 
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protect shareholder value and prevent unlawful activity or hostile takeovers251 
while allowing public transparency in ownership that is necessary to manage 
company performance. Such an ownership disclosure regime can only benefit 
the company’s performance and increase the legitimacy of transparent 
company ownership disclosure regimes while also boosting investor 
confidence. 
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this article is to contribute to the growing debate on 
mandating company ownership disclosure, its impact on capital markets, and 
contributions or constraints on corporate performance.  
Recent international and comparative studies as well as market 
analyses indicate that, while much has been accomplished by way of 
legislating mandatory disclosure of beneficial ownership information within 
national borders, the deafening pace of innovation in financial instruments as 
well as the creative use of corporate vehicles across international jurisdictions 
have made existing accomplishments moot in terms of fighting cross-border 
illicit activities and financial crimes. 
This article argues that, on balance, mandatory ownership disclosure 
and enforcement regimes have a more positive contribution to company 
performance than any constraints they may impose. At the same time, to 
achieve the much-desired goal of a publicly transparent beneficial ownership 
regime, greater focus and effort is needed in the areas of harmonized 
definitions of beneficial ownership and transparency, harmonized, integrated 
and consistent cross-border ownership disclosure thresholds, notification 
frameworks that leverage technology and reduce procedural pitfalls and 
inefficiencies, reduced or subsidized compliance cost management 
frameworks, especially for small business owners, and increased political will 
across all major developed and developing economies towards combatting 
the illicit use of corporate vehicles for unlawful gain. In a global economy, 
the real competition is not between well-meaning domestic companies or 
cross-border, multinational enterprises. The real competition is between all of 
these legitimate, innovative corporations and those who seek to use such 
vehicles for terrorism financing, money laundering, tax evasion, cross-border 
                                                
251 See generally Kalant, supra note 3, at 1059-66 (discussing, in particular, the 
potential positive impact of U.S.’s ITLEAA bill on combatting illicit activity, 
exposing the use of shell corporations for illegal purposes and improving law 
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163                               Chi.-Kent J. Int’l & Comp. L.                 Vol. XVI 
 
 
arms sales, and manipulation of shareholder voting rights and capital markets. 
The battle has just begun. 
